JACKSON V. MANN

JACKSON v. MANN

Nathaniel JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis F. MANN, Superintendent, Shawangunk C.F.;  Paul Levine, Deputy Superintendent for Programs, Shawangunk C.F.;  D. Taylor, Inmate Grievance Supervisor, ShawangunkC.F.;  A. Goodman, Jewish Rabbi, Shawangunk C.F.;  Leah Brunson,Counselor, Shawangunk C.F., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 97-2968

Argued:  Sept. 24, 1999 -- November 05, 1999

Before:  WINTER, Chief Judge, KEARSE, and McLAUGHLIN, CircuitJudges.

Sarah Beth Landau, Coudert Brothers, New York, N.Y. (Douglas F. Broder, ofcounsel ), for Plaintiff-Appellant.Julie S. Mereson, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, State of New York, Albany, N.Y. (Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General,State of New York, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, State of NewYork, Nancy A. Spiegel, Assistant Attorney General, State of New York, ofcounsel ), for Defendants-Appellees.

BACKGROUND

Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment for defendants,we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, thenonmoving party.

Nathaniel Jackson, an African-American, has been an inmate in the New YorkState prison system since 1986.   When Jackson entered the prison systemin 1986, he identified himself as Jewish.   Jackson thereafterparticipated in the prison system's alternative kosher diet program at variouscorrectional facilities until his transfer to Shawangunk Correctional Facility(“Shawangunk”) in August 1995.   Under New York Department ofCorrectional Services (“DOCS”) policy, eligibility for the kosherdiet program is determined by a prison's Jewish Chaplain “through aprocess of interview and review of documentation to substantiate the inmate'sJudaic background and intent to strictly observe Jewish dietary law.”

Upon his arrival at Shawangunk, Jackson again listed his religiouspreference as Jewish and asked to be placed in the kosher diet program so thathe could receive kosher meals as part of his religious practice.   Hisrequest was granted pending a formal determination of his eligibility for thekosher diet program by the prison's Jewish Chaplain, Rabbi Goodman.  Rabbi Goodman told Jackson that he could approve a kosher diet only if Jacksonwas in fact Jewish.   There are only two ways to be Jewish, Rabbi Goodmanexplained:  you had to be born Jewish or had to have completed a formalconversion process.

Jackson disagreed with these strictures and claimed that he was Jewishbecause he read the Torah and ate kosher food.   He told Rabbi Goodmanthat his prison records would confirm his Jewish status.   The rabbi gaveJackson a Congregational Questionnaire which asked about his Jewish practices,but Jackson only partially completed it.   Jackson later told RabbiGoodman that he had indeed been born Jewish, but the rabbi was unable to reachJackson's mother to substantiate this claim and Jackson himself declined tocontact his mother for “fear of upsetting her.”

In September 1995, based on Rabbi Goodman's finding that Jackson had notoffered sufficient evidence that he is Jewish, Jackson was removed from thekosher diet program.   He refused for eight days to eat the non-kosherfood provided to him.

Previously, in August 1995, Jackson had filed a grievance with theShawangunk Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (“IGRC”)complaining that he was being denied a kosher diet.   Duane Taylor, anInmate Grievance Supervisor, met with Jackson and agreed to investigate hiscomplaint.   After several meetings with Jackson, Taylor forwarded thegrievance to Louis Mann, the Superintendent of Shawangunk, who denied it on thegrounds that Jackson had not completed the questionnaire and that it was beyondthe scope of the IGRC to determine whether or not Jackson was Jewish,especially while Rabbi Goodman was in the process of doing just that.  Mann's decision was later reviewed and confirmed by the Central Office ReviewCommittee, which noted that Jackson could not be considered Jewish because hedid not provide Rabbi Goodman with the proper acceptable documentation asprescribed by the New York Board of Rabbis.   Paul Levine, the DeputySuperintendent of Shawangunk, then sent Jackson a memo reiterating that hiseligibility for participation in the kosher diet program depended on more thanhis just saying that he is Jewish.

In late 1995, Jackson commenced this pro se action under 42 U.S.C.ß 1983 against Rabbi Goodman and various other prison officials in theUnited States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy,C.J.).   He alleged that the prison officials' refusal to provide him witha kosher diet violated his rights under:  (1) the Free Exercise Clauseof the First Amendment;  (2) the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protectionand Due Process Clauses;  and (3) the Eighth Amendment's provisionsagainst cruel and unusual punishment.   Jackson later added a ReligiousFreedom Restoration Act claim in an amended complaint.

He sought money damages and an injunction requiring the prison officials toprovide him with a kosher diet.   Jackson also moved for a preliminaryinjunction, but that motion was denied as moot when the prison officials agreedto provide him with kosher meals pending the outcome of this litigation.  Apparently that agreement remains in effect, and Jackson continues to receivekosher meals.   Preferring to remain embroiled in this litigation,however, prison officials have refused to grant Jackson such mealsindefinitely.

After some discovery, Jackson moved for summary judgment arguing that he hadpracticed Judaism both before and during his incarceration, and that hefollowed Jewish dietary laws.   Jackson attached an affidavit, purportedlyfrom his mother, “Mary Jackson,” stating that she had raised himaccording to the Jewish faith.   He also attached prison records listinghis religious preference as Jewish and institutional records showing that hehad participated in kosher diet programs at other New York prisonfacilities.

The prison officials cross-moved for summary judgment.   They arguedthat:  (1) Jackson did not demonstrate that he was Jewish;  (2)his claims failed under the (now invalidated) Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 42 U.S.C. ß 2000 bb-1 (1993);  and (3) they were protected byqualified immunity.   The prison officials attached an affidavit fromRabbi Goodman, in which he stated that a Jew is a person who is born Jewish orhas formally converted to Judaism.   In his affidavit, Rabbi Goodmanstated that Jackson never claimed to have formally converted to Judaism andthat various statements in Jackson's institutional records conflicted withJackson's assertion that he had been born Jewish.   Specifically,Jackson's records showed that:  (1) in 1981 he indicated that hefollowed no religion;  (2) in 1982 he changed his religious status from“none” to Muslim;  and (3) in 1983 he again apparentlyindicated that he had no religious beliefs.   Accordingly, Rabbi Goodmanfound that Jackson had failed to show that he was Jewish.

The district court granted summary judgment to the prison officials anddenied Jackson's motion.   The district court addressed only Jackson'sfree exercise claim.   Relying on Rabbi Goodman's statement that “aJew is one who was born Jewish or has formally converted,” the courtfound that Jackson had produced no proof that he was a Jew according to thepractices of the Jewish religion, and concluded:

The New York State Department of Correctional Services, in adhering tothe[ ] standards [of the Jewish religion], is not denying plaintiffaccess to the steps necessary to become Jewish.   They [sic] are merelyrestricting the “Alternative Kosher Diet” program to those inmateswho are in fact Jewish.   This being the case, there are no triable issuesof fact.

The district court then dismissed Jackson's action in its entirety.

Jackson now appeals with counsel appointed by this Court.   This Courthas already dismissed Jackson's appeal against defendants Taylor and Brunson.  He argues that the district court:  (1) improperly grantedsummary judgment to the prison officials on his free exercise claim because thecourt failed to determine whether Jackson's religious beliefs were“sincerely held”;  and (2) improperly denied his own motionfor summary judgment.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part andremand.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo.  See Bedoya v. Coughlin, 91 F.3d 349, 351 (2d Cir.1996).

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material factand that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdictfor the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

I. The Prison Officials' Motion for Summary Judgment

Jackson contends that the district court erred when it concluded that therewere no triable issues of fact.   The prison officials argue that: (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment;  and(2) even if they were not entitled to summary judgment on all of Jackson'sclaims for relief, they were at least entitled to qualified immunity onJackson's claim for money damages.

A. The Free Exercise Claim

 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is an“unflinching pledge to allow our citizenry to explore ․ religiousbeliefs in accordance with the dictates of their conscience.” Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir.1984).   Prisonersretain their right to religious freedom even when incarcerated.   SeeJackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1096 (2d Cir.1997).   An inmateis therefore entitled to a reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs.  See Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.1975).   Thisincludes religious dietary beliefs, as “prison officials must provide aprisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples.”  Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir.1992)(per curiam ).

 In determining whether a prisoner's particular religious beliefs areentitled to free exercise protection, the relevant inquiry is not whether, asan objective matter, the belief is “accurate or logical.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476 (2d Cir.1996).   Instead, theinquiry is “whether the beliefs professed by a [claimant] are sincerelyheld and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,185, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965)) (alteration in original) (emphasisadded).   A claimant need not be a member of a particular organizedreligious denomination to show sincerity of belief.   See Frazee v.Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 103L.Ed.2d 914 (1989).

 The district court erred by granting summary judgment to the prisonofficials on Jackson's freedom of religion claim.   In making itsdecision, the district court relied on Rabbi Goodman's statement that “aJew is one who was born Jewish or has formally converted” to concludethat Jackson is not “in fact Jewish” according to the“practice of the Jewish religion.”   This reasoningerroneously substituted the objective “accuracy” of Jackson'sassertion that he is Jewish for the correct test-whether Jackson's beliefs are“sincerely held.”

Viewed through the prism of sincerity, Jackson has produced sufficientevidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his religiousbeliefs are “sincerely held.”   He submitted prisondocumentation that:  (1) listed his religious preference as Jewish; (2) showed his participation in kosher meal programs in several othercorrectional facilities;  and (3) showed that he had actually gonewithout food for several days to avoid eating non-kosher food.   He alsosubmitted an affidavit from his mother, in which she stated that she had raisedJackson according to the Jewish faith and dietary laws.

The prison officials never mentioned the “sincerely held belief”standard or challenged the sincerity of Jackson's beliefs.   Instead, theycontinue to assert that we should simply uphold the DOCS policy of deferring toJewish religious authorities on the question whether an inmate is Jewish forpurposes of the kosher diet program.   This argument might have merit ifthe DOCS policy furthered some legitimate penological interest.   SeeFarid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 925 (2d Cir.1988) (“[A] prison regulationthat impinges on inmates' constitutional rights may be valid if it isreasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”).  However, the prison officials have not cited any penological objective advancedby relegating to religious authorities the decision whether someone is or isnot Jewish for purposes of the kosher diet program.   While the prisonofficials may assure themselves that Jackson's religious beliefs are sincerelyheld, see Jackson-Bey, 115 F.3d at 1096-97, they need not-indeedcannot-determine “the objective truth of [his] beliefs.” Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157.

The prison officials maintain that the question of Jewish status is an“ecclesiastical question” beyond the competence of the courts, andis best left to the prison's religious authorities.   We disagree becausethe question whether Jackson's beliefs are entitled to Free Exercise protectionturns on whether they are “sincerely held,” not on the“ecclesiastical question” whether he is in fact a Jew under Judaiclaw.   Courts are clearly competent to determine whether religious beliefsare “sincerely held.”   See, e.g., Farid, 850 F.2d at 926.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred when it granted summaryjudgment to the prison officials on Jackson's freedom of religion claim.  A remand is therefore necessary to determine the sincerity of Jackson'sreligious beliefs.

B. Jackson's Other Claims

 Jackson mounts two additional constitutional arguments, neither ofwhich has merit.   First, he argues that by allowing Rabbi Goodman todecide which prisoners should be considered Jewish, the prison“excessively entangled” the state with the Jewish faith inviolation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.   Althoughthis argument is muddied, it essentially restates Jackson's Free Exerciseclaim-that the prison officials unconstitutionally refused to provide him witha kosher diet because they did not consider him “Jewish” underJudaic law.   This argument is more properly anchored in the Free ExerciseClause than the Establishment Clause.   See, e.g., Patrick, 745 F.2d at158.

 Second, he argues that the prison officials violated his equalprotection rights by requiring him to prove that he is Jewish according toJudaic law while allowing members of other religions to practice theirreligions without making a similar showing.   This contention fails,however, because Jackson presented no evidence whatsoever that he was treateddifferently from similarly situated members of other religions.   SeeGiano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir.1995).

C. The Qualified Immunity Defense

 In general, public officials are entitled to qualified immunity if: (1) their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutionalrights;  or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them to believe theiracts did not violate those rights.   See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 857(2d Cir.1996).

 The prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.  When the prison officials denied Jackson's requests for a kosher diet, it wasclearly established that:  (1) “prison officials must provide aprisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples,” Bass,976 F.2d at 99;  and (2) the Free Exercise Clause affords protection toreligious beliefs which are “sincerely held,” Patrick, 745 F.2d at157.   Because these rights were clearly established at the time of thealleged deprivation,1 and because the prison officials offer no reason toconclude that their acts were “objectively reasonable,” the prisonofficials are not entitled to qualified immunity.   See Bass, 976 F.2d at99 (holding that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity whenthey refused inmate's religiously motivated dietary requests).

II. Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment

Jackson argues that his own motion for summary judgment should have beengranted because he did demonstrate the sincerity of his belief in the Jewishfaith.   We disagree.

Jackson has not shown that he is entitled to summary judgment on his freeexercise claim.   Although there is evidence in the record from which afactfinder could conclude that Jackson “sincerely” believes thathis religion requires him to eat a kosher diet, there is also countervailingevidence from which a factfinder could draw the opposite conclusion.  While Jackson told Rabbi Goodman that he was born Jewish, and also that he hasheld his beliefs since childhood, his prison records show that in 1981 heindicated that he followed no religion, that in 1982 he changed his religiousstatus from none to Muslim and that in 1983 he again apparently indicated thathe had no religious beliefs.   In addition, one of Jackson's prisongrievances states that he has been a practicing Jew for only seven years.  Based on Jackson's numerous conflicting statements, a reasonable jurycould doubt the sincerity of his beliefs.   The district court did not errwhen it denied Jackson's summary judgment motion.

III. Injunctive Relief

 Jackson argues that he should be granted preliminary injunctive reliefin the form of kosher meals.

This request is moot because the parties have agreed that he will continueto receive a kosher diet pending the outcome of this litigation.   Wetherefore reject the motion for injunctive relief, without prejudice to arenewal should Jackson's kosher diet be interrupted.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them to bewithout merit.   Accordingly, we AFFIRM the denial of the appellant'smotion for summary judgment, REVERSE the grant of the appellees' motion forsummary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.

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